Introduction
Vietnam aspires to follow in the footsteps of the "Tiger" economies of Asia. Over the last 10 years, the government has focused significant financial and political capital on advancing rapid economic development and on building modern, job-providing cities. But even with a strong development bias Vietnam has been forced to recognize that rapid growth can have potentially ominous environmental implications -as seen quite clearly in the neighboring cities The basic premise of the CDR model is that community action can and does sometimes drive environmental regulation. While my research sought to examine three dynamics -state pressures, market pressures, and community pressures on firms -as the research unfolded, it became clear that community action was the key dynamic underlying both state actions and firm initiatives to reduce pollution in Vietnam. While communities are the key actors in this model, the state is also crucial. It is the ability of communities to pressure the state which creates incentives for firms to reduce pollution. From my interviews with government regulators it is clear that the vast majority of regulatory actions in Vietnam occur only after community complaints. For instance, staff at three of the most important environmental regulatory agencies -the Departments of Science, Technology and Environment (DOSTE) in Ha Noi, Dong Nai, and Phu Tho -admitted that all inspections to date have been driven by community complaints.
Representatives of the National Environment Agency (NEA) similarly acknowledged that the inspections conducted up to the time of my interviews were instigated after community complaints. Staffing weaknesses in environmental agencies, the current absence of a system for prioritizing inspections, and the strength of community demands, has led to a situation of essentially community-driven inspections.
While it might be expected that communities will complain about pollution and that these complaints will sometimes motivate the state to take action, it is not at all clear why certain communities mobilize (when others do not), and why some mobilizations are effective (while others fail). Reality is much more complicated than a simple linear model of community-statefirm pressure. And community mobilizations alone do not explain pollution outcomes.
Environmental processes are influenced by pollution impacts, community strategies and actions, state interests and actions, and firm responses. The state is clearly not monolithic, with agencies varying in level of authority and interests. Internal state conflicts and contradictions often 7 influence regulatory implementation. Other actors are also involved, including local and international NGOs, the scientific community, consumers (who may be local or international), and the media. These actors make up a complex "ecology of agents" around pollution controversies.
Community mobilizations influence both the occurrence of state regulatory actions, and the effectiveness of these actions. Community pressures (combined with extra-local pressures) have contributed to the generation of new environmental laws in Vietnam, and the practical implementation of these laws. Analyzing the relations between community actors and state agencies, among state agencies, and between state agencies and firms, is critical to specifying how agents of livability interact and how Community-Driven Regulation really works.
The CDR process leads to more than just pro forma state actions. Community members in general are much more interested in results -that is, pollution reduction -than in inspections, reports, EIAs, or even agreements to build treatment plants. Mobilized communities thus serve as an expansive team of monitors to follow-up on inspections and promises of improvement. This is particularly important as monitoring and follow-up are the Achilles' heel of traditional top-down environmental regulation.
CDR can also help overcome the common limitations of traditional environmental regulation. Tensions always exist within the state regarding environmental regulation. The most basic being the conflict between the desire to promote accumulation (either by attracting foreign firms or supporting state-owned enterprises (SOEs)) and the countervailing pressure to regulate the adverse impacts of industry. On a micro-level, there are significant incentives (both direct and indirect) for government inspectors to not enforce environmental regulations. There are also often severe constraints on staff and funds which make regulation difficult even for the most committed inspectors. Community participation in the regulation process helps to tip the balance 8 in this equation towards enforcement. At a minimum, community actions make it more difficult for firms to bribe local officials or to falsely claim problems have been solved.
While CDR is quite dynamic and varied, successful cases follow a generally similar pattern: (1) communities identify environmental problems and instigate action to solve themusually through complaint letters to a local government agency, letters to the firm, or protests;
(2) the state responds by investigating, gathering data, and analyzing past performance and existing requirements on the firms; (3) the state may also set fines or require technical changes inside the factory; (4) the community monitors the state's actions and any changes in the performance of the firm (albeit through unscientific means); (5) if pollution is not reduced the community escalates its pressure on the firm and challenges the state to fulfill its legal mandate, often turning to extra-local actors such as the media, NGOs, or higher governmental bodies to support their claims.
This pattern of environmental regulation differs from both traditional command-andcontrol (CAC) regulation and simple public participation models in a number of regards. Under CAC, a "patrol" model 1 is employed in which the state sets environmental standards, establishes 9 creates the forums of participation (Canter 1996 , Fiorini 1995 This combination of a baseline standard with continuous improvement has numerous advantages over command-and-control regulation. In the best case, CDR can result in a "virtuous circle" whereby community actions pressure an environmental agency to take action, which results in pollution reduction, bolstering community demands and agency capacities, which leads to further community actions and state responses.
For CDR to be effective, community, state, and firm actions must converge in a synergistic manner. Communities must mobilize effectively, there must be a point of leverage within a state agency, and firms must be responsive to state and community pressures. These characteristics and actions are influenced by history, political openings, and existing structures of mobilization and regulation, as well as by the relations developed between firms, communities, and the state.
The Actors in CDR
There are four key actors in Community-Driven Regulation: (1) community members affected by the pollution from a factory; (2) officials within state agencies responsible for regulating and promoting a factory; (3) extra-local actors such as the media, NGOs, and consumers; and, (4) the decision makers within the factory. The characteristics of these actors, their interests, and their interactions shape the effectiveness of environmental regulations. This "ecology" of actors and interactions is critical to whether environmental regulation is effective in
Vietnam.
In this chapter I seek to move beyond the general model laid out in the introductory chapter and to specify of the dynamics which characterize the interactions of these four kinds of actors when environmental conflicts are focused on degradation caused by factories. While the concrete sequences that characterize my cases are obviously specific to the Vietnamese context, the analytical dynamics of these cases are potentially relevant well beyond Vietnam. Before going into the six specific cases, it is useful to present some of the analytical characteristics and interactions central to the model and the conditions under which these actors combine to advance pollution reduction and livability.
Communities
Community characteristics and their relations to firms and the state determine whether communities mobilize, how they mobilize, and whether their actions are effective in pressuring for pollution reductions. Factory managers interested in protecting their interests will also attempt to build and activate ties to the local agency. Linkages must therefore be balanced by state autonomy. The key to their impact is connectedness -or linkages once again. NGOs can be embedded not just in a set of provincial or national connections, but in a set of global networks which can, under certain circumstances provide extraordinary leverage on behalf of local livability, and create a window of opportunity for local regulation.
Extra-local Actors

Firms
Finally, of course, there are the firms themselves. In my cases, the firms are primarily agents of degradation, but they are also potential agents of livability. It is, therefore, crucial to try to conceptualize the characteristics that make firms more or less likely to respond positively when they are put under pressure by communities, state agencies or extra-local actors to reduce their pollution. Having the capacity -in the form of technological and fiscal resources -to reduce pollution creates the possibility for firms to become agents of livability, but motivation is usually more important than capacity.
Linkages, particularly in the form of social ties between a firm and the community, can be instrumental in motivating a firm to take action on pollution problems. 
Six Case Studies of Community-Driven Regulation.
Specific case studies are the best way to understand the complexities of the process of Community-Driven Regulation. The cases that follow are drawn from a larger investigation which involved reviewing data from a wide sample of factory/community relations, conducting over 150 interviews and making site visits to 40 different factories. The six cases were selected in order to illustrate what I considered to be a good range of outcomes in instances of community efforts to force factories to change their polluting behavior.
All of the cases must obviously be situated in the context of the particularities of 
Overview of Cases
Pollution in the Pews: Moral Organizing around Dona Bochang Textiles
Local regulators say the air pollution from the Dona Bochang Textiles factory is really not all that bad. The local community however, does not seem placated by the thought that other communities have it worse. In their view, pollution from the factory (a joint-venture whose majority owners are Taiwanese) is a continuing assault on the neighborhood, affecting peoples' daily lives, disrupting special occasions, even defiling their center of worship -the local Catholic church. Pollution impacts such as respiratory problems, corroded roofs, and blackened plants have led to an escalation of community actions that have included regular complaint letters, throwing bricks at the factory, working with the media, and developing a long-term campaign to make the factory a better neighbor or move it altogether.
As the Taiwanese With regular pollution incidents affecting the church, the tight-knit community has a focal point for discussing and organizing around pollution issues. While the parish priest claims he does not organize community actions, he admits that the community cannot help but discuss the pollution while at the church. In church, affected families have a chance to mention their concerns to the chairman of the local Phuong (or ward) People's Committee, who also happens to be Catholic and lives near the factory.
In my interviews, one family stood out as leaders of community action. This family seemed fairly well educated and quite well off for the community, running their own small household enterprise finishing wood furniture. Living and working just a few feet away from the factory wall, the family had collected a thick file on the factory's pollution, including press clippings, letters they had sent to various government agencies, the responses they had received, and photographs of pollution impacts. They regularly drafted letters for others to sign. They had been on the official delegations to the factory and to government meetings. They had even made a video of the pollution. In many ways, they seemed fearless in their quest to end the pollution, a quest they have yet to finish.
After years of having their complaints ignored, an incident served to ignite community actions in 1993. On the day of a local wedding (for a different family), pollution from the factory coated trays of food laid out for the reception in a layer of black soot. A large number of community members considered this the last straw and marched to the front gate and threatened to tear down the wall and shut down the factory if the manager did not come out to talk to them.
Some young people went so far as to throw bricks at the factory, highlighting how serious the community was in their determination to force a response.
On that day a factory representative asserted that the factory was doing all they could and promised the problems would be solved. The community forced the manager to sign a statement attesting to the level of pollution. Photographs were taken. Several months later, when nothing had changed, the community brought their complaints, the pictures, and the signed statement, to the Dong Nai Department of Science, Technology, and Environment (DOSTE) and the media.
After newspaper reports questioned the failure of the government to regulate the pollution, the DOSTE agreed to take action.
The DOSTE responded to the community complaints by organizing an inspection team and several meetings between community members and the factory. The community however, criticized the inspection process, charging that because it was a planned inspection, the factory was able to turn off the polluting equipment before the inspectors arrived. Community members argued that their daily experiences were more accurate than the data collected from the inspection. Later, when pollution levels resumed, the community sent more written complaints to the government and the media. This renewed pressure motivated more meetings, and finally resulted in the factory agreeing to install equipment to reduce its emissions.
By the fall of 1997, the neighbors of Dona Bochang had achieved a qualified victory over the factory. Since the wedding party incident, the factory had made three changes to reduce its air pollution. First, it built a taller smokestack -the classic solution to local environmental problems. When this did not reduce the local impacts, the factory changed its practice of "blowing the tubes" from its boiler, which was a major source of the black soot people complained about. Finally, when this still had not resolved the problems, the factory installed an air filtration system to capture the pollution. This process took several years, but resulted in a significant reduction in air emissions (according to the firm and the Dong Nai DOSTE).
The state's role in this case is complicated. As this is a joint-venture, the Dong Nai People's Committee owns 10 percent of the factory. Community action is thus in conflict with the short-term economic interests of the provincial People's Committee (which controls the DOSTE). The community's perception that they had to overcome this conflict of interest led them to look to extra-local actors such as the National Environment Agency and the media to help address their problems. It also strengthened the community's resolve to keep pressure on the factory and the provincial authorities. Community members did not trust the state to take action without repeated pressure. However, at the same time, the fact that the factory was a majority foreign owned may have worked to the community's advantage. Vietnamese government agencies appear extremely sensitive about public perceptions that the state is privileging foreign capitalists over common people.
The Dona Bochang case is a demonstration of the importance of community capacity and cohesiveness. The improvements at Dona Bochang appear to be due in large part to the strength, organization, and persistence of a tight-knit local community. However, it should be noted that the community on its own, was not able to change Dona Bochang. Direct letters and meetings with the factory did not result in pollution reductions. Success came through pressure on local and national government agencies, exerted both directly and through the media. For instance, during my research it was common to read headlines in the Vietnamese press such as "Dona Bochang Factory Continues to Generate Pollution." The community's linkages to local government officials and extra-local reporters were critical to generating this kind of attention and to its ultimate success in motivating state action.
The Dona Bochang case represents a clear success of CDR. A cohesive and connected community was able to pressure a state agency to take action on a polluting firm. The community sounded repeated alarms, and monitored state and firm actions. By using official complaint procedures, as well as unofficial tactics (protests, threats, media pressures), a tightknit, capable community was able to exert significant influence over pollution issues.
Lam Thao's Bitter Tea: The State as the Polluter
A woman in her 60's led me and a group of neighbors to the wastewater canal they said was the source of many of their illnesses. With the skill and strength of a lifelong farmer she dug down several feet into the soil to expose a leaking pipe. Further on, several men used a crowbar to pry open the cement cover of the wastewater pipe to show more leaks and to illustrate how the wastewater had literally burned away the cement cover. Acid in the wastewater, which often has a pH as low as 1, had contaminated the community's drinking water. Even their tea, the lifeblood of the Vietnamese day, is now bitter. The positive side, one woman joked, is that they don't have to add any spices to make sweet and sour soup. While community members complain that they have been living with the pollution of the factory since its opening in 1962, they assert that pollution increased substantially in 1992, after the plant was expanded. In one hamlet, the People's Committee (PC) chairman explained "We did not realize [how bad the pollution was] until the disease rates became high and some environmental organizations investigated." He asserts that the death rate in his hamlet doubled in 1992, the year the factory increased its output (personal interview, April 18, 1997).
Other health problems associated with the factory's pollution include "swollen skin, rashes, people losing teeth (they become loose and fall out from drinking the water), the rate of cancer has increased recently, and children have problems with their throats." A local nurse notes that air pollution caused high rates of lung illnesses, and "swollen throats are very common close to the factory" (personal interviews, April 18, 1997). Pollution from the factory also regularly damages crops. Water and air pollution kill rice, banana trees, and coconut trees. Asked why these actions were taken, the Vice-Director of the factory explained simply that the changes were necessitated by community pressure. This is likely an oversimplification, but it does highlight the importance of community pressures in the transformation of this seemingly insulated state enterprise. Capital investments in equipment changes were justified by both environmental and economic benefits. Switching from graphite to titanium electrodes in the electrolysis process helped the factory substantially reduce its energy costs, thereby lowering overall production costs. At the same time, the change reduced lead emissions and accidental releases of chlorine gas. The company then established an emissions monitoring program after a round of particularly vocal community complaints.
In 1995 the factory took another step that no factory in Vietnam had ever taken, giving tours of the factory to concerned community members. These tours were prompted by community complaints at a meeting of candidates for local elected office. 4 The candidates turned the idea of touring the factory into a campaign promise that has since been honored by tours once or twice per year. The factory has also set up a program to reward workers for coming up with ideas to reduce waste or improve the environment. In 1996, the factory awarded workers a total of 50 million dong (~$3600) for ideas that were implemented.
Living with pollution over the last 30 years, the community around Viet Tri has developed a strong awareness of environmental issues. Half of the workers from the factory live nearby, raising the awareness level and technical knowledge of the community. The acting Director lives only 200 meters from the factory gates. Community members, including some who work in the plant, have written numerous complaint letters about the pollution problems.
The community around Viet Tri Chemicals thus has a very high level of capacity for responding to environmental issues.
Because of the gravity of pollution problems from Viet Tri Chemicals workers and managers seem to take these issues quite seriously. As the factory used to have frequent releases of chlorine gas, the workers became intimately aware of the health impacts of the factory's pollution. Groundwater pollution was also hard to ignore as it contaminated the wells of many of the workers who lived nearby. The community around Viet Tri -although including groups with very different interests -workers, managers, farmers and other residents -is fairly unified on pollution issues. Awareness, and close connections to the impacts of emissions, has led the community to exert significant pressure on the factory over the years.
In 1996, when a late-night spill from the factory's detergent line killed fish in a cooperative fish pond, community members were at the factory gates the next morning with evidence, and demands for compensation. Several government officials mentioned these spontaneous "gatherings in front of the factory" as a major pressure on Viet Tri Chemicals.
There are however, divisions within the state regarding the factory, which is a centrally managed state enterprise. The profits from Viet Tri (if there are any) go to Hanoi, while the problems stay in the community. The few benefits from the factory accruing to local officials seem to be counter-balanced by community complaints, and the fact that the factory continues to stain the city's reputation. It is thus somewhat understandable that local officials would support the factory's closure or at least stricter regulation.
The very real threat of being shut down, driven by both local calls for the factory's closure and poor economic performance, has led the management to take seriously the need to change. One manager intimated that the factory's bad reputation was one reason they were not getting government loans. Viet Tri Chemicals thus did not respond to pollution complaints by simply building taller smokestacks or installing waste treatment systems, but instead chose to significantly upgrade their production methods. Changing the production process helped change the company's environmental reputation, which helped the factory in several other regards.
As in other parts of Vietnam, community members in Viet Tri submit complaints to the local People's Committee, which then forwards the complaints to the responsible agencies.
However, two differences seem to be at work in this case. First, when community members complain about Viet Tri Chemicals it is the factory that has the burden of proof to show they are not guilty. This is the opposite of virtually every other case I examined in Vietnam. For example, in the fish kill from the detergent spill, it was the factory rather than the community that requested the DOSTE to inspect the situation. The factory felt they needed data to show they were innocent. Most factories would be presumed innocent until proven guilty. This shows the strong linkages and trust the community has developed with the state. Second, while Viet Tri Chemicals is a state enterprise, local government officials have made clear that they are willing to challenge the central government to resolve problems at the factory. Local elected officials appear to consider this an issue they cannot ignore. This cleavage between state agencies provides a political opening for community demands.
Viet Tri Chemicals shows that SOEs can be regulated under certain circumstances. A connected community with strong capacities was able over a number of years to put the factory on the defensive. Through changes in state concerns and conflicts between local and central agencies, a previously insulated factory became vulnerable to community complaints.
Community members were successful in establishing an effective system of alarms, and vulnerable factory managers then turned these pollution concerns into pollution prevention strategies that had both environmental and economic benefits.
Living Off Pollution: The Divided Community around Tan Mai Paper Mill
Just meters beyond the outer wall of Tan Mai Paper mill, a thriving industry exists in the shade of coconut trees. In ponds where rice fields used to lie, local villagers stand chest deep in wastewater from the factory. Young men strain to lift nets out of the ponds, filled to the brim with the catch of the day: paper fiber emitted in the mill's wastewater.
As one part of this community literally lives off wastewater, selling recovered fiber to low-grade paper makers in nearby Ho Chi Minh City, other people pay the price of damaged crops, polluted drinking water, and dead fish. Tan Mai is an example of a divided community that both depends on the factory's pollution for income and is injured by its activities. Some community members work in the factory. Others complain of losing entire years crops with no compensation.
Although Tan Mai had been causing pollution since the 1960's, it was not until the factory increased its production in 1992 that community members organized as a group to demand recourse for dead fish and damaged crops. Between 1992 and 1996, community members wrote letters to the DOSTE, the media, and to the factory management. The DOSTE investigated the claims of the community, but never showed the results to community members, and never awarded compensation for lost crops or fish.
Few people argue that Tan Mai does not have serious environmental impacts. The factory managers acknowledge that they need a new waste treatment system. Even the people who make their living off recovering fiber express their concern about the impacts of the factory's pollution. Local farmers cannot eat the rice they produce, instead using it only to feed to their pigs. Community members complain of nausea from air pollution, undrinkable wellwater, nose, eye, and skin problems, and lower yields from their fruit trees.
However, the community around Tan Mai is both physically and emotionally divided.
One group of families lives next to the factory's back wall, collecting the paper fibers, another group grows rice in fields nearby, a third group lives in company-built apartments on the urban side of the factory, and a fourth lives in fish-raising houseboats on the river into which Tan Tan Mai is owned and managed by central state authorities, and is at the same time under the regulation of the National Environment Agency. Either through corruption or a concerted policy, the state has worked to block criticisms and demands for environmental improvements at factories such as Tan Mai. For instance, after complaints from the community, the DOSTE took measurements of water pollution at Tan Mai. However, these measurements were taken in a way that covered up the real pollution levels (for example, some samples were actually taken upstream from the factory, where the water was relatively clean). The DOSTE then issued a formal memo stating that the factory was in compliance with environmental standards. Everyone involved in this case recognizes that Tan Mai is nowhere near compliance with environmental
standards, yet this document is now accepted as proof of Tan Mai's performance. Once Tan Mai received the DOSTE memo, neither the community nor local government authorities were able to fine or seek compensation from the factory.
Community members have thus resigned themselves to the factory's continued pollution, seemingly giving up on further complaints. Community members gave different reasons for no longer writing complaint letters, including: "they have no effect," "they only result in DOSTE coming out, measuring, and then disappearing" and "they get you noticed by the authorities."
This discouragement is not uncommon. Other communities I studied also feared that complaints would be ignored or cause more trouble than they were worth. Nonetheless, other communities persevered and were sometimes successful.
The community around Tan Mai however, has been unable to overcome internal divisions and resistances. The community is in fact endowed with a reasonable level of capacities, including a mix of educated young members and industrial workers. The community even has some connections to local government representatives. Nonetheless, they have not been able to forge broader state or media linkages, and their internal divisions have weakened their ability to pressure environmental agencies to take action against a centrally managed, Ministry of Industry factory.
Tan Mai is for a number of reasons an extremely well insulated company. The government has targeted the paper industry for expansion and is aggressively promoting the three largest pulp and paper mills in the country (including Tan Mai Nhat" which meets regularly to strategize about the factory, and is headed by a retired professor.
Community members were successful in pressuring the government to commission a study on the factory's pollution. The results of the study by a university professor found that 3000 people were adversely affected by pollution that included: carbon monoxide emissions 70 times higher than permitted, dust 10 times higher, sulfur dioxide 4 times higher, and other toxic gases 5 to 7 times the permitted levels (Nguyen 1996). By the early 1990s, everyone seemed in agreement that the factory was a problem. Every level of government imaginable had been contacted. Data clearly showed the factory in violation of environmental laws. Nonetheless, the 32 factory continued with business as usual.
The community around Ba Nhat has all of the critical traits necessary to motivate action on environmental issues. They are cohesive, have high technical capacity, and have good connections to government officials. The community is the best educated of any I studied, made up of current and retired professors from the nearby Polytechnic University, as well as government employees. People are relatively well-off, solidly upper middle class in Vietnam.
The community is in an urban area, close to the hallways of power. The community even has access to a wealth of damning environmental data. However, even with all of these critical characteristics, the community failed for year after year to win changes at Ba Nhat.
City government agencies are at the center of the Ba Nhat decision making. The Hanoi Department of Industry (DoI) owns and manages the factory. The Hanoi Department of Science, Technology, and Environment (DOSTE) is responsible for regulating Ba Nhat (although community members complain that responsibility for environmental management of the factory is not well defined). Both agencies report directly to the Hanoi People's Committee. Within this political system the DOSTE is much weaker than DoI. In fact, the DOSTE has not shut down or moved any of DoI's 200 factories, despite repeated promises to do so.
For years the community failed to find any leverage over the DoI. For state-owned enterprises like Ba Nhat, environmental reforms necessarily involve one state agency pressuring another state agency to make a change. As the National Environment Agency does not have jurisdiction over city-owned factories, this case boils down to a political battle between the promoters and regulators of Ba Nhat within the Hanoi city government. Failing to motivate changes in the Hanoi bureaucracy, community members took their complaints to higher levels, petitioning the National Assembly and even the Prime Minister.
Finally, in late 1998, after more than 10 years of community complaints, the Hanoi government announced that it would physically move the factory out of the city center to a rural area with an existing chemical complex. DOSTE staff explained in interviews that they had faced a series of battles to win this decision. First, the DOSTE had to overcome the DoI's resistance to moving the factory. When DOSTE finally won approval to move the factory out of the city center, they then had to begin the process of working with suburban and rural government officials and community members to convince them to accept the factory. These efforts were blocked twice before a rural community with an existing chemical plant finally agreed to accept the plant. Continued (and escalated) community pressures from the Ba Nhat community were critical to strengthening the position of the DOSTE, and I believe, ultimately tipped the scales towards moving the factory. As one government official explained, "Pollution was the key issue on motivating the move. There were many complaints from the public, and the National Assembly representative from Hai Ba Trung worked to push forward the decision. Ba
Nhat is the first factory in Hanoi to be moved by force because of public pressure" (personal interview -December 26, 1998).
The Ba Nhat case shows clearly that community capacity and cohesion alone are not enough, and at the same time illustrates the subtleties of linkages. This is by no means an isolated community, but its connections with the state were frustrated by other powerful interests for 10 years. With no autonomy and little capacity, the Hanoi DOSTE is almost powerless to regulate polluting state enterprises that provide jobs and tax revenues to the Department of Industry. Only connections that were able to invoke a state agency or power above the Hanoi People's Committee, and extensive public pressure through the media, was ultimately able to overcome the dominant position of the Department of Industry.
Global Production, Global Communities: Nike Shoe Manufacturing in Vietnam
In workers. During the summer months the workers sweat in hundred degree-plus temperatures at their assembly lines. Workers are exposed to toxic solvents and glues that often make them dizzy or nauseous (and which would be much more strictly regulated in countries like the US).
Respiratory ailments are common, as are accidents in some of the more hazardous sections. And then there is the repeated verbal and physical abuse they experience at the hands of foreign managers.
More than seven thousand miles away, in cities such as Portland, San Francisco, and New York, human rights and labor activists have been strategizing on how to change the conditions inside factories like Tae Kwang. While the activists might not know the name of this factory, who its manager is, or who even owns it, they are clear on who is responsible for the poor labor and environmental conditions in the factory: Nike Inc.
Nike is the world's leading producer of sports shoes and apparel, with $9.6 billion in sales in 1998. Nike is also one of the world's leading innovators in global out-sourcing. Nike owns none of the factories that produce its famous sports shoes. The five Nike factories in Vietnam which employ 35,000 workers are owned by Korean and Taiwanese subcontractors. Nike still designs its shoes in Beaverton, Oregon, but prototype shoes are produced in Seoul or Taipei, and a final production run is likely to be done in China, Indonesia, or Vietnam.
For 20 years, this subcontracting arrangement was a win-win situation for Nike. The company was able to create competition between subcontractors, push down production costs, shift risk, and avoid the difficulties of managing hundreds of thousands of workers. Nike was also able to use the subcontracting system as an excuse to avoid responsibility for environmental and working conditions in the factories that produce its shoes. As Nike neither owned nor managed the factories, they argued they could not be held responsible for day-to-day conditions.
Never mind that Nike staff are in the factories every day monitoring what is produced, how it is produced, and the quality of the final products.
Managers at Tae Kwang are careful to explain that they don't just sell shoes to Nike, they 
Summary of the Cases
The six cases presented above offer compelling evidence of the importance of community capacity, cohesiveness, and linkages in solving pollution conflicts in Vietnam. Table X summarizes the key characteristics of the cases and their outcomes. When state agencies can act autonomously and are responsive to community needs, they are much more likely to enforce environmental laws. And when firms are both vulnerable to external pressures and in a strong market position, they are more inclined to reduce their pollution. The cases also show that community action is a necessary but not sufficient condition for pollution reduction in Vietnam. In more than one of the cases, mobilized communities that had taken a wide range of actions against a local polluter still failed to motivate the firm to reduce its pollution.
Summary of Cases
While there is no proto-typical community that succeeds at CDR, a number of features of successful communities stand out, including: cohesiveness within the community; capacity as manifested both in strong leadership and an overall level of skills and sophistication; and linkages, particularly in the form of connections between the community and local government authorities. Essentially, successful cases involved communities with strong internal social ties and strong external political ties that forcefully and strategically pressured a state agency to take action.
While three of my cases indicate that CDR can work, all of the cases illustrate the variety of factors that can stand in the way of effective community action. Divisions within the community, poor organizing, and the inability to find leverage over a recalcitrant state agency, undercut possibilities for achieving greater livability. Sometimes, communities can be arenas of conflict, and otherwise incapable of mobilization. Firms and government agencies can then capitalize on these divisions.
Even when communities organize successfully, their capacity can limit what they demand and achieve. With little data and no training, community members often end up only complaining about pollution problems that they can see, smell, or feel. This results in a focus on purely localized, short-term, acute impacts of pollution. This type of pollution likely accounts for a significant percentage of industrial pollution in Vietnam at present. Nonetheless, this focus severely limits the range of environmental issues that become priorities for state action. With no knowledge of technical alternatives, communities tend to push for pollution control rather than prevention simply because their main concern is stopping local emissions. Another potential problem with CDR is that stronger communities may force factories to clean up or move, and will scare off dirty factories from siting in their area, gradually shifting pollution to areas with the weakest communities.
The clear limits of community capacity and the potential equity implications of a system driven purely by community pressures, underscores the importance of strengthening the capacity and roles of allies within the state apparatus. At present, environmental agencies at all levels in At the same time, state actions help support community mobilization. For instance, passage of the Law on Environmental Protection served to legitimate community complaints regarding pollution, even while state agencies were unable to enforce the specifics of the law.
Creation of the National Environment Agency and the provincial DOSTEs provided a target for community complaints, even though these agencies initially couldn't do much. An emerging state environmental infrastructure thus serves to support community actions and demands.
Potentially, the CDR process can create a kind of "virtuous circle" of environmental regulation. As communities make demands on the state, environmental agencies are forced to improve their inspection and enforcement capacities (in order to retain legitimacy). As inspections and enforcement improve, communities are buoyed by successes to make greater demands on the state. In three of my cases, state agencies played pivotal roles in supporting and legitimating community demands for pollution reduction. Successful community action requires identifying and focusing pressure on the right actors within the state. When successful, this dynamic supports a process in which state agencies and civil society actors develop and grow and strengthen their roles as agents of livability along side one another.
Evans (1996) argues that "linking mobilized citizens to public agencies can enhance the efficacy of government," and that synergy occurs when "civic engagement strengthens state institutions and effective state institutions create an environment in which civic engagement is more likely to thrive." The outlines of CDR in Vietnam display this dynamic of mutually reinforcing interactions between organized communities and state environmental agencies. At the minimum, these cases point to the potential for state-society synergy in industrial environmental regulation.
Again, the Vietnamese case should be considered a hard test of the Community-Driven
Regulation process. The successes that we see in Vietnam occurred in a context with no independent local NGOs, no free press, no vulnerable elected officials, weak environmental agencies, and significant poverty driving development imperatives. Under more supportive circumstances, CDR would have much greater chances of success. 5 At the minimum, the cases in 44 Vietnam attest to the value of exploring the CDR model elsewhere.
While only in its embryonic phase, CDR already shows potential to significantly improve environmental regulation in Vietnam. Policies and programs that formalize mechanisms of community input into state environmental decision-making, create greater legitimacy for community demands, educate citizens about their rights, and support local monitoring efforts, would move Community-Driven Regulation forward, and go a long way towards meeting the challenge of balancing industrial development with environmental and livability concerns.
